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SUING THE UNITED STATES
ROBERT VOGEL*
This article is written to help North Dakota practitioners avoid
the most common errors made in suing, or attempting to sue, the
United States. It is not intended to be exhaustive, and certainly is
not intended to encourage such litigation (none of my salary is con-
tingent or dependent on volume of work).
CONSENT TO BE SUED AND LIMITATION ON CONSENT
Just as the State of North Dakota has not given a general waiver
of its sovereign immunity from suit,' neither has the United States.2
It is fundamental that the sovereign cannot be sued without its con-
sent, and this general principle is generally insisted upon by both
state and federal governments.
The federal government has adopted several rather broad consent
statutes waiving its sovereign immunity in certain types of cases.
Among these are statutes permitting suit in actions to quiet title and
for foreclosure, where the government claims a lien;' partition
suits;4 tort claims cases;' tax refund cases; 6 and certain actions
based on contract, statute, or regulations. 7 This list is by no means
complete, but it includes the types of cases most frequenty brought
in this District.
Among the types of actions not consented to are proceedings
against the government as garnishee.s
The consent of the government to be sued, where it has consent-
ed, is conditioned on compliance with its procedural requirements,
which are generally not difficult to meet. But compliance is juris-
dictional.
Very often in actions of foreclosure or to quiet title which name
the United States as a party, the complaint fails to state "with par-
ticularity" the nature of the interest or lien of the United States as
required by 28 U.S.C. 2410. Compliance with this requirement is
jurisdictional.9 The United States Attorney's office will ordinarily
call the omission of the requirement to the attention of the plain-
* United States Attorney, District of North Dakota.
1. See N.D. Const. § 22; N.D. Rev. Code § 32-1202 (1943).
2. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2410.
4. Id. § 2409. For venue provision, see section 1399.
5. 28 U.S.C. if 1346(b), 1491. For limitation of action, see section 2401(b); for
procedure and exceptions, see sections 2671-80.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1). For venue provision, see section 1402.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2). For venue provision, see section 1402.
8. See, e.g., Applegate v. Applegate, 39 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Va. 1941).
9. City Bank of Anchorage v. Eagleston, 110 F. Supp. 429 (D. Alaska 1953).
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tiff's attorney. Even so, failure to state the claim with particularity
results in putting the plaintiff's attorney to the trouble, expense and
delay of amending the complaint, and sometimes even repeating
service of the summons and complaint. If the attorney for the
plaintiff should insist that service on the United States, of the sum-
mons and complaint which does not particularize the government
lien, is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the government,
the United States Attorney would undoubtedly move for the dis-
missal of the action as against the government. 0
In connection with actions to foreclose liens and to quiet title, it
is important to note that consent is granted to sue the government
only where "the United States has or claims a mortgage or other
lien" on the property.1 Thus, where the government claims a fee
title there is no consent. A recent case in this District is one of the
few, but unanimous, cases so holding.1
It should also be noted that recent cases hold that Section 2410,
supra, is strictly a wavier of immunity statute, and not a grant of
jurisdiction to the court; it follows, then, that an action to quiet title
against the government cannot be brought in federal court unless
there can be found elsewhere a grant of jurisdiction to the federal
court to try the particular case.' 3 For example, if there is a diversity
of citizenship between the parties or a counterclaim by the United
States, the court would have jurisdiction. 4 Since consent has been
given to be sued in the State courts, which are courts of more gen-
eral jurisdiction, no such problem ordinarily arises when the suit is
commenced there.
FORUM
As I have indicated, the United States has consented to be sued
in either state or federal court in actions to quiet title and to fore-
close liens." The action must be brought in federal court or court
of claims in the other types of cases mentioned - partition,
6 tort,1 7
tax refund,' 8 and contract or statutory actions.'" If the United
States is named a defendant in any of the latter kinds of actions, in
state court, the United States Attorney will no doubt file a special
appearance objecting to the jurisdiction of the court.
10. Ibid.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2410.
12. Hull v. Tollefson, 138 F. Supp. 315 (D.N.D. 1956).
13. George v. U.S., 181 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Texas 1960); Tomkins v. U.S., 172 F.
Supp. 204 (S.D. Texas 1959).
14. Tompkins v. U.S., supra note 13.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2410.
16. Id. § 1347.
17. Id. § 1346(b).
18. Id. § 1346(a) (1).
19. Id. § 1346(a) (2), 1491.
[VOL. 37
SUING THE UNITED STATES
Even where the government has consented to be sued in state
court, it still has the option of removing the suit to the federal
court.20 The general policy of the government is not to remove un-
less there is a serious and disputed question of federal law involved.
PLEADING
Where the government has consented to be sued, there is no need
to allege or prove diversity of citizenship, or that the amount in con-
troversy is over $10,000, or any other jurisdictional allegation re-
quired in private litigation. But, in actions against the government
as in all other civil cases, the complaint must contain "a short and
plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends."'
1
I must add one word of caution on the importance, in actions to
quiet title or for foreclosure, of specifying with particularity the
claim of the United States. Not only is such specification required
by statute, but the relief obtained by the plaintiff is dependent on
it, for no lien of the United States is avoided unless it is so specified.
In other words, even though the plaintiff obtains a judgment that
appears to quiet title against all claims of the United States, in fact
only those claims or liens which are specified in the complaint will
be actually affected by the judgment.
PARTIES
Another common error in actions which -are, in reality against the
government is to name a department or officer of the government
as a defendant. This is improper, except in certain limited cases,
such as those where it is permissible to sue a Director of Internal
Revenue in tax refund case s,12 or to sue the Review Committee in a
marketing quota case,23 or where the relief against the individual, as
distinguished from the government, is actually sought. Where the
relief is sought from the government as such, it should be sued, and
the proper appellation is "United States of America".
Some government-owned corporations have the power to sue and
be sued. In such cases, the federal statutes setting up the corpora-
tion will so state.
24
SERVICE
Of all the errors made in suing the United States, improper ser-
vice of process is probaby one of the most frequent.
20. Id. § 1444.
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
22. This is a practice that goes back many years. It is apparently not authorized by
statute, but is permissible. See .Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 (1.S. 373 (10-32).
23. 7 U.S.C. § 1365.
24. E.g., as to Commodity Credit Corporation, see 15 U.S.C. § 714(b), (c).
1961]
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The procedure to be followed in serving the United States in
actions in federal court is set forth in Rule 4(d) (4) of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The procedure to be followed in serving the
United States in permitted actions to foreclose or quiet title in state
courts is set out in Section 2410 of Title 28 U.S.C. In either case it
should be noted that service must be made on both the United
States Attorney and the Attorney General. Service on the United
States Attorney may be made through the United States Marshal,
or a Sheriff, or will be admitted in the usual case, where jurisdiction
is clear. Service on the Attorney General should be made by regis-
tered mail by the United States Marshal. The fee is $2.00. Though
neither statute nor rule require it, the Attorney General appreciates
receiving two copies of process and pleadings, rather than only one.
OTHER MA'rEns
In most actions against the government, the paintiff is not en-
titled to a jury trial.25 In tax refund cases, however, either party
may demand a jury.
20
In the absence of an express provision in an Act of Congress, the
government is not liable for costs.2 7 But in tax refund cases and
certain other permitted non-tort cases the court may allow costs
from the time of joining issue, if the government put in issue the
right to recover, 28 and in Trort Claims Act cases costs, exclusive of
attorneys' fees, are allowed.2 9 Plaintiff's attorneys should also note,
even though with a jaundiced eye, that the court or department
head granting or making a Tort Claims judgment or settlement may
determine and allow attorneys' fees of up to 10% of an administra-
tive settlement, or 20% of a court judgment or compromise by the
Attorney General, to be paid out of, but not in addition to, the
amount of the judgment or award, and that any attorney charging
or receiving more than these amounts commits a criminal offense."°
A few comments and warnings on the Tort Claims Act might be
in order. This Act is not at all precise, perhaps in the hope that
precision would be worked out through court decision. This is not
the place for an analysis of the Act, but any attorney for a would-
be tort claimant would be well advised to study the various excep-
tions to the Act, and the cases interpreting them. For example, one
of the exceptions is the one relating to "discretionary functions" of
the government. Among the cases interpreting this and other terms
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2402.
26. Ibid.
27. Id. § 2412(a).
28. Id. § 2412(b).
29. Id. § 2
4
12(c).
30. Id. § 2678.
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of the Act are the cases involving multi-million dollar claims against
the government on account of the Texas City disaster of a few
years ago,"' and a recent case from this District.
-3 2
There is no trial by jury in Tort Claims cases.
COMPROMISE AND SErLEMENT
Though I am going outside the area covered by the title of this
article in doing so, I think it is my duty to call to the attention of
the Bar the fact that there are administrative procedures which can
be used to avoid litigation with the government and still attain the
objectives of settlement of disputes with the government.
First, tort claims of $1,000 or less can be settled administratively
by the head of any federal agency or his designee.3" Of course,
this is done only after an investigation has satisfied the officer that
the claim is meritorious.
Second, where the discharge of a tax lien clouding a title is de-
sired, serious consideration should be given to applying to the Di-
rector of Internal Revenue for release or discharge of the lien.3.
This procedure may be simpler and cheaper than bringing an action.
If the debt is uncollectible or the lien is worthless, the Director
will generally give a release or discharge. It should be remembered
that the United States will have a year of redemption 35 from any
foreclosure sale if its lien is held valid in the foreclosure action,
while an administrative discharge or release avoids the uncertainty
the existence of the right of redemption creates. Many federal de-
partments have funds available to make redemption from execution
sales, and, contrary to common opinion, sometimes they do redeem.
Third, even after an action is started, the United States Attorney
or the Attorney General has the power to compromise actions
against the United States. There is no more reason for hesitating
over settlement negotiations with the government than with any
private litigant. Some attorneys may be surprised to find that the
United States Attorney sometimes has more authority to make settle-
ments than a lawyer in private practice. Settlement negotiations
can always be taken up with the United States Attorney. If the case
happens to be one where he does not have the authority to settle,
he will refer the offer to the proper agency or officer.
RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS
Regardless of provisions of general state or federal statutes, the
31. Dalehite v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
32. McGillic v. U.S., 153 F. Supp. 565 (D.N.D. 1957).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2672.
34. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6325, 7122.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c).
1961]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
United States has sixty days in which to answer.30 Thus, a default
taken against the United States after the twenty day period speci-
fied in the Summons and in the state law, but before the sixty day
period fixed by federal statute has expircd, would be void as against
the United States.
The time for removal of actions from state to federal court is the
same for the government as for private parties- twenty days. 3
Even though the United States has sixy days in which to file an
answer (and it sometimes takes nearly that long to assemble the in-
formation on which the answer is to be based) it is the practice of
the United States Attorney's office to file the answer as soon as the
necessary information can be compiled.
It is against government policy to permit a default to be taken
against it. This is true even where the government's interest arises
because of a lien which is inferior to the one being foreclosed by
the plaintiff. In such cases we file an aji,wer setting forth the de-
tails of the government claim, and ask the court to determine its
priority and foreclose it.
This does not mean that all government cases are contested, or
that they must await a term of court for trial. Where the govern-
ment has no valid claim, we will often file a disclaimer of any in-
terest in the subject matter of the litigation.
When the action is triable to the court, we are ordinarily glad to
stipulate for a trial date, without awaiting the opening of a term.
Finally, although we must of course set up defenses such as lack
of consent to be sued, and failure to allege the government's claim
with particularity, we do not conceal their existence, but call them
to the attention of the plaintiff's attorney at the first opportunity.
For instance, we always point out immediately by letter failure to
make proper service or to describe the government's claim so that
the defect can be corrected, if possible.
CONCLUSION
The attorneys in the United States Atorney's office have been in
private practice and know the problems of the private practitioner
- including, frequently, lack of access to federal statutes and de-
cisions. It is our hope that this article may, in some degree, reduce
the number of times mistakes are made in bringing actions against
the government (without increasing the number of such actions that
are brought).
36. Fed. R .Civ. P. 12(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2410(b).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
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